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The increasing number of Hispanic non-citizens being punished by the Federal courts 
has revived the debate about sentencing disparity. This study extends extant research 
by examining contextual variation in the punishment of Hispanic defendants, with a 
focus on citizenship status. Using data from the United States Sentencing 
Commission for FY2008, this paper purports to explain that variation using factors 
drawn from an immigration threat standpoint. The results indicate that the expected 
variation exists, with non-citizens receiving shorter or lengthier sentences than 
citizens, depending on the place of sentencing. Moreover, Hispanic political 
representation and unauthorized immigrant populations had a slight but significant 
negative and positive effect, respectively, for all Hispanic defendants. Also, the 
former aspect had a minor and negative impact on sentence length for Hispanic non-
citizens. These findings contribute to a better understanding of how Hispanics are 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Researchers have traditionally focused on the role of race and–more recently– 
ethnicity on sentencing disparities (Demuth & Steffensmeier 2004; Mitchell 2005; 
Ulmer 2012). Even though unwarranted disparities on sentencing have been a major 
concern for policymakers and researchers for decades, they still continue to be an 
aspect that has not been definitively resolved (Mitchell & MacKenzie 2004; Tonry 
1996). At the federal level, one of the issues that has arisen in the last two decades is 
the increasing number of non-citizens being sentenced by the district courts. Research 
on the role of citizenship on federal sentencing has increased in the last decade, but in 
comparison to other aspects, this is one that still requires more in-depth examination 
(Ulmer 2012). One topic that warrants more discussion is the ostensible contextual 
disparity in the punishment of Hispanic non-citizens. This paper attempts to assess 
this inquiry and explain it by including factors intended to measure the contextually 
differentiated presence of Hispanic immigrants, as well as the enforcement of the 
immigration laws across the nation. 
Ethnicity and Citizenship Status on Sentencing 
Research on the role of ethnicity on sentencing has increased in the last two 
decades (Demuth & Steffensmeier 2004; Johnson et al. 2011; Mitchell & MacKenzie 
2004; Steffensmeier & Demuth 2000, 2001; Ulmer 2012; Warren et al. 2012). The 
role of ethnicity on sentencing has largely been studied with reference to individuals 
of Hispanic origin. The last decades have been characterized by an increasing 
Hispanic population. According to the 2010 Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2011a), 




constitutes 16% of the population. Hispanics have increased from 22.4 million in 
1990 to 35.3 million in 2000, when this group made up 13% of the population. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the Hispanic population increased by 57.9% (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2001). It is estimated that Hispanics will be 30% of the nation’s population by 
July 1, 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011b).1 Apart from the traditionally higher 
Hispanic birth rates, immigration has played a major contribution in this regard. 
This Hispanic population trend has affected the demographics of the U.S. 
correctional and criminal justice systems. According to the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (2011), the estimated male and female Hispanic prison population under 
state and federal jurisdictions rose from 206,900 and 10,000 in 2000, to 327,200 and 
18,700 in 2010, respectively. Hispanics have been the fastest growing group being 
imprisoned, comprising 20% of the state and federal populations in 2005, a rise of 
43% since 1990 (The Sentencing Project 2007). This pattern has been even more 
notorious at the federal level. In 1992, Hispanics accounted for less than 25% of 
offenders in the federal courts, but over 40% in 2004 (Light 2010). By March 2012, 
the Hispanic prison population at the federal level represented a 34.7% of the total 
(Federal Bureau of Prisons 2012). 
Ethnicity and citizenship status are closely related. The great majority of non-
citizens in the United States are of Hispanic origin. According to the Department of 
Homeland Security-DHS (2012a, 2012b), both the estimated legal permanent and 
unauthorized immigrant population residing in the United States in 2011 was 
13,070,000 and 11,510,000 people, respectively. The largest single percentage 
                                                 
1 Nonetheless, it should be noted that in the previous four years the influx of Hispanic immigration to 




corresponded to Mexican immigrants, who represented approximately 3,320,000 
(25.4%), and 6,800,000 people (59%), respectively. The percentages of all the other 
countries of origin were far lower, but the cumulative proportion of the most 
representative Latin American countries apart from Mexico reached the 17.2% and 
16%, respectively. This means that at least 43% of non-citizen legal residents and 
75% of the unauthorized immigrant population residing in the United States are of 
Hispanic origin. Overall, the combination of these estimates reveals at least 58% of 
non-citizens residing in the United States are Hispanics. 
The presence of non-citizens in the United States correctional system is 
noticeable. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (2009) reported that in FY 2009 more than 
one quarter of the inmate population was non-U.S. citizens (26.7%). The majority of 
them were Hispanics, with Mexico contributing to the highest proportion. The federal 
criminal justice system has witnessed a steady increase of non-citizen defendants. An 
early report of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1996) revealed that the number of non-
citizens processed in the federal criminal justice system increased an average 10% 
annually from 1984 to 1994. This contrasts with the overall rate of the federal 
criminal caseload, which increased on average less than 2% annually in the same 
period of time. More recently, the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC 
2008) reported that the proportion of non-citizen offenders rose from 22.7% in FY 
1991 to 37.4% in FY 2007. Moreover, since FY 1997, Hispanics have accounted for 
more than 80% of non-citizen offenders. This means that a large and increasing 





The Pervasive Impact of “Crimmigration Law” on Hispanic Non-citizens 
Deportation is a major concern for non-citizens in general and Hispanics in 
particular (Bibler 2011; Cruz 2010; Guerra 2008; Welch 2004). According to the Pew 
Hispanic Center’s 2008 National Survey of Latinos (Lopez & Minushkin 2008), 
approximately 40% of Latinos say they worry a lot about deportation, and an 
additional 17% say that they worry some that they themselves, a family member or a 
close friend may be deported. This is a slight increase from 2007, when the 
magnitude of these concerns reached the 53%. Several qualitative and quantitative 
studies show that one of the most relevant preoccupations for Hispanic immigrants is 
the fear of being deported and its consequences (Arbona et al. 2010; Bhuyan 2008; 
Brabeck & Xu 2010; Brotherton & Barrios 2009; Brotherton & Martin 2009; Bucher 
et al 2010; Cervantes et al. 2010; Das 2008; DiDenti 2010; Fussell 2011; Gonzales & 
Chavez 2012; Hagan et al. 2011; Landale et al. 2011; Phillips et al. 2006).  
Although the dramatic effects of deportation are likely to reach family and 
community members regardless of their citizenship status, deportability makes an 
outstanding difference between citizens and non-citizens because U.S. citizens do not 
face the threat of deportation.2 This is not the case for non-citizens and indeed not for 
unauthorized residents. Even though unauthorized immigrant residents can be 
deported just because of their illicit presence in the country, legal authorized as well 
as unauthorized immigrant residents formally share the same likelihood of 
deportation when they commit the sort of offenses that trigger the deportation 
mechanisms (Reyes 2012). Deportation has been traditionally considered an 
immigration policy instrument. However, nowadays some authors have thoughtful 
                                                 




reasons to believe that it is being used also as a crime control mechanism (Sklansky 
2012). Laws passed during the last two decades have increased the threat of 
deportation, which has even made the distinction between citizens and non-citizens 
regardless of their residency status more critical (Bibler 2011). 
In the last three decades, the boundaries that delimit immigration enforcement 
and criminal justice have blurred (Brody 2011; Frey & Zhao 2011; Hagan & Phillips 
2008; Hagan et al. 2008; Kanstroom 2000; Reyes 2012; Sklansky 2012; Stumpf 
2011). Immigration has always been a multifaceted phenomenon, but now more than 
ever it is also immersed in the realm of crime control as gate-keeping, which 
emphasizes the importance of identity and territory in an era of globalization and 
massive labor force mobility (Allegro 2010; Bibler 2011; Bloch & Schuster 2005; 
Bosworth 2012; Ewing 2010; Fassin 2011; Flynn 2005; Robinson 2006; Tambini 
2001; Zedner 2010). This paradoxically has given rise to what is called 
“crimmigration law” (Bosworth 2012; Franko 2011; Murphy 2012; Reyes 2012; 
Sklansky 2012; Stumpf 2011; Zedner 2010). Zedner (2010) associates the term 
crimmigration with the concept of criminalization of immigration. More thoroughly, 
Stumpf (2011) considers that crimmigration law is a phenomenon by which “criminal 
and immigration law intersect both formally and functionally, magnifying the 
government's exclusionary power… criminal and immigration law combine to expand 
the circumstances under which the government imposes immigrations consequences 
for crimes, including expulsion, detention, or incarceration… legislatures have 




A number of authors refer to the existence of a separate criminal justice 
system for “enemy foreign nationals” (Fekete & Webber 2010; Gómez-Jara 2008). 
This phenomenon has been magnified due to the recent occurrence of terrorist attacks 
that have promoted even more tough immigration policies (Bloch & Schuster 2005; 
Bosworth & Guild 2008; Dubber 2010; Flynn 2005; Hagan & Phillips 2008; K. 
Johnson & Trujillo 2007; Pauw 2000), a phenomenon often referred as 
“securitization” (Bibler 2011). The war against organized crime and terrorism is since 
then being used to justify the introduction of criminal justice legislation and practices 
that empower the criminal justice system (Guerra 2008; McLaughlin 2011). 
Punishment of immigrant crime performs the double task of strengthening values of 
national identity, and protecting the local and the national population from 
threatening foreign elements (Diaz 2011; Franko 2011; Mendelson 2010).  
The first important legal reform that converged immigration and criminal laws 
took place with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (Frey & Zhao 
2011; Lawston & Escobar 2009). This reform increased funding for U.S. border 
patrol agents and penalized employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers 
(Ewing 2010; Hagan & Phillips 2008). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA) 
marked the inception of a legislative trend toward increased removal of non-citizens 
with criminal convictions (Welch 2004). This act set the category of “aggravated 
felonies” for justifying deportation, which at that time comprised a narrow class of 
offenses such as murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking (Davenport 2006).  
The Immigration Act of 1990 added “crimes of violence” as a subcategory of 




this category to include the actual or attempted illicit trafficking of any controlled 
substance and any money laundering offense, and both federal and state convictions 
(Davenport 2006; Welch 2004). A border enforcement initiative implemented in 1993 
–called “Prevention through Deterrence”–has collaterally led immigrants to cross the 
border through rural and life-threatening areas where border patrol might have a 
tactical advantage (Alonso 2003; Hagan & Phillips 2008; Quinn 2011). In 1994, the 
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act further expanded the 
definition of aggravated felony and added even more crimes, for example, theft 
offenses sanctioned with at least five years of incarceration, child pornography, alien 
smuggling, and the attempt to commit these offenses (Welch 2004).  
This legislative approach was substantially exacerbated with two reforms 
passed in 1996: the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 
sanctioned in response to the Oklahoma bomb attack of April, 1995 (Welch 2004); 
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 
labeled by many critics as the “Mexican Exclusion Act” (Hagan & Phillips 2008). 
This legislation transformed the immigration regime, making it even more restrictive 
(Lawston & Escobar 2009; McDermid 2001; Morawetz 2000). Judicial review for all 
categories of immigrants eligible for deportation was virtually eliminated (Morrison 
1997; Legomsky 2006). Suspended sentences were considered actual sentences for 
immigration enforcement purposes, and a wide range of crimes became subject to 
mandatory detention (Morawetz 2000). Sentence length for crimes of theft or 
violence to be considered aggravated felonies was reduced from five years to one 




In addition, the categories of non-citizens subject to detention and deportation 
were expanded (Brody 2011; Hagan & Phillips 2008; Montague 2001; Morawetz 
2000). For instance, “expedited removals” were intensified at the expense of 
voluntary returns. The definition of aggravated felonies was broadened to include 28 
offenses (Hagan & Phillips 2008; Morawetz 2000). Likewise, convictions for the 
broad and subjective category of crimes of moral turpitude remained as a basis for 
deportation (Dadhania 2011; Moore 2008). These reforms included a retroactive 
provision that allowed deportations due to aggravated felonies committed before the 
passage of these laws (Hagan & Phillips 2008; Morawetz 1998). Finally, the 
PATRIOT Act enlarged even more the net of immigration control by increasing 
administrative powers to detain and deport immigrants perceived as threats to 
national security (Hagan & Phillips 2008).  
Deportation may be seen as an available mechanism for getting rid of 
threatening aliens (Bloch & Schuster 2005; Gibney 2008; Kanstroom 2000; Pauw 
2000). One of the most relevant manifestations of this policy approach is early 
disposition programs, so called fast-track sentencing. In essence, this is a type of 
guideline downward departure that allows the judge to reduce the length of the 
incarceration term in those cases in which the defendant and the prosecutor have 
signed an agreement under the specific conditions of a program established in the 
sentencing district. Moreover, the characteristics and history of these programs reveal 
their intimate relationship with immigration enforcement.  
Initially, these programs were de facto implemented in some southern border 




established a more formalized scheme of fast-track sentencing (Cho 2010; Gorman 
2009). Then, the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated USSG § 5K31 (Gorman 
2009), authorizing a downward departure of no more than four levels as to whether 
the Government files a motion for such departure based upon a disposition from a 
program previously authorized by the Attorney General. This authority issued a 
memo (Ashcroft 2003) in September 2003 authorizing the implementation of fast-
track programs, whether a district confronts a vast number of a specific class of 
offenses or faces an exceptional circumstance related to a particular type of case that 
may significantly strain prosecutorial and judicial resources; those cases should also 
be highly repetitive and present substantially similar fact scenarios, and not involve 
offenses designated as “crimes of violence.” 
Most of fast-track programs have been implemented in southern border 
districts, and target immigration offenses, with the great majority of them 
corresponding to illegal reentry after deportation cases (Cho 2010; Gorman 2009; 
Ogden 2009).3 However, some districts also have programs that target drug-related 
offenses (Ogden 2009). The specific characteristics and functionality of each of these 
programs vary by district. On the whole, fast-track programs accelerate the disposal 
of criminal cases, and serve the purpose of advancing immigrant deportation 
proceedings (Cho 2010). 
The use of the criminal justice system as a mechanism for immigration control 
is also noticeable in the cooperative efforts maintained between federal immigration 
enforcement and local and state law enforcement. The 287(g) provision is a key and 
                                                 
3 A Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General dated January 31, 2012, established new and 




controversial feature of IIRIRA that falls within this approach (Coleman 2012; Hagan 
et al. 2011). Throughout this devolution policy,4 the federal government is authorized 
to sign a memorandum of agreement with state and local law enforcement in order for 
them to participate in immigration control, an attribution that corresponded only to 
federal immigration agents (Parrado 2012; Wishnie 2011).  
The implementation of 287(g) programs started in Florida only after the 
Department of Justice issued a memo in 2002 announcing that states have the 
“inherent authority” to enforce civil provisions of immigration law (Armenta 2012; 
Coleman 2012; Parrado 2012; Wishnie 2011). Following Florida, Alabama in 2003 
and Arizona in 2005 were the next to implement these kinds of programs, followed 
by many other states and local governments. In 2007 and 2008, the application of 
these programs significantly increased with the inclusion of 26 and 34 new 
jurisdictions, respectively (Parrado 2012). The implementation and effects of these 
programs vary across jurisdictions (Coleman 2012; Hagan et al. 2011). 
Not surprisingly, this emphasis on deporting unauthorized and convicted 
immigrants has been reflected in the deportation rates. The number of deportations 
has been experiencing a continuous increase with the passing of the 1996 laws, and 
more clearly since 2002 when the number of deported immigrants more than doubled 
from 165,000 in that year to 393,000 just seven years later (Parrado 2012). The 
average daily immigrant detention population rose from 9,011 in FY 1996 to 21,133 
in FY 2003 (Phillips et al. 2006). Deportations for criminal and non-criminal reasons 
                                                 
4 In summary, devolution policies define the transferring of competencies that traditionally belonged to 




increased from 33,842 and 17,082 in 1995, to 188,382 and 203,571 in 2011, 
respectively (Department of Justice 2002; Department of Homeland Security 2012).  
Deportation has usually been qualified as a collateral consequence of a 
criminal sanction (Budeiri 1981; Pinard 2006). Nevertheless, many scholars argued 
that deportation is in fact a punishment and the most important consequence of a 
conviction for many non-citizen defendants (Chin & Love 2010; Cruz 2010; Das 
2008; Dow 2007; Kanstroom 2000; McDermid 2001; Murphy 2012; Ortiz 2011; 
Pauw 2000; Reyes 2012). For instance, Ortiz (2011) reasoned that today deportation 
serves incapacitation, deterrent, and retributive purposes, whereas Das (2011) pointed 
out that deportation has essentially turned into a “mandatory minimum” penalty for 
many types of criminal convictions.  
The recent Supreme Court decision in Padilla v. Kentucky (March, 2010) 
made it even clearer that deportation is a direct consequence of a criminal conviction 
for many non-citizen defendants (Kanstroom 2011). In Padilla, the Court held that 
defense counsel’s failure to advise a non-citizen client of the deportation 
consequences of a conviction constituted ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment (Chin & Love 2010; Ewald 2011). The Court reasoned that since the 
recent legislative changes expanded the list of deportable offenses and restricted the 
repeal powers of judges, now deportation is virtually inevitable and automatic for a 
vast number of non-citizens convicted of crimes.  
In spite of the fact that this legislative and policy approach on immigration 
enforcement can be considered a national tendency, it is likely that its impact varies 




immigration trends differ across jurisdictions. The immigrant population substantially 
contrasts between regions and locations. Urban metropolises such as Los Angeles, 
Houston, and Miami are characterized by vast Hispanic communities, whereas other 
areas especially in the Midwest have minor Hispanic populations (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2011a). The proportion of the unauthorized immigrant population also varies 
across states. The estimated unauthorized immigrant population as of January 2011 
was 2,830,000 in California, 1,790,000 in Texas, 740,000 in Florida, and 630,000 in 
New York (DHS 2012a).  
The number of Hispanics incarcerated also diverges across territorial 
circumscriptions. To illustrate, as of 2008, there were 17,010 non-citizens 
incarcerated in California and 9,940 in Texas, whereas only 16 in Maine and 12 in 
North Dakota (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2008). Immigrants fare differently through 
states in a variety of aspects, such as median income, home ownership, and poverty 
(Pew Hispanic Center 2010). Finally, Latino political representation is also divergent 
among jurisdictions. For example, Latino legislators in state legislatures during 2009 
represented 14% in Arizona, 23% in California, and 44% in New Mexico, whereas 
less than 5% in Connecticut, Maryland, and Iowa (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2009).  
More consequential are the differentiated statistics regarding deportation and 
immigration enforcement actions. The number of deportation proceedings initiated 
among the thirty immigration jurisdictions differs substantially. For instance, 
according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Immigration Project 




which constituted the 18.58%, followed by California with 33,342 (14.57%), Arizona 
with 19,392 (8.48%), and Florida with 19,075 (8.34%). Conversely, in the rear were 
Oregon with 729 (.32%), North Carolina with 997 (.44%), Connecticut with 1,447 
(.63%), and Tennessee with 2,076 (.91%).5  
These figures underscore the fact that the incidence of deportation and 
immigration enforcement is different across states and jurisdictions. This may not be 
only a function of the differential presence of Hispanic immigrants across the U.S. 
territory, but also a consequence of the immigration policy choices made in each 
location. Even though the federal government is in charge of the homeland security of 
the country, as mentioned above (p. 10), it has established devolution policies that 
allow state and local law enforcement authorities and officers to perform immigration 
enforcement activities, such as the mentioned 287(g) programs. This means that there 
are jurisdictions that seem more proactive than others at enforcing the immigration 
law, and as a consequence of that, they seem more interested in the swift removal of 
immigrants. Sentencing courts are likely to be impacted by these contextually 
differentiated immigration policy approaches and environments (Chin 2011).  
This review illustrates how close being a convicted non-citizen is now 
associated with being deported. This reflects the increasing important role of 
deportation on non-citizens’ sentencing outcomes. It also highlights the contextually 
differentiated emphasis placed on the removal of immigrants. In this context, the 
current study is an attempt to advance the quantitative research on the impact of 
defendant citizenship on sentencing. This paper echoes the argument that immigration 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that these figures does not represent the number of deportations executed during 
2008, nor the total number of proceedings concluded in that year. They represent the total number of 




enforcement is a fundamental factor for understanding non-citizen sentencing (Chin 
2011), but with a particular focus on the contextually differentiated emphasis placed 
on them. Concretely, this paper will expand on existing sentencing research by 1) 
examining contextual variations in the punishment of Hispanics, 2) including 
immigration enforcement contextual pressures as a key element of that analysis, and 
3) measuring contextually differentiated approaches and attitudes toward deportation 








Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Empirical Research on the Impact of Citizenship Status on Sentencing 
Research on the role of defendant citizenship on sentencing has expanded in 
the last decade. Initially, it was typically included as a control variable in studies, but 
more recent studies have attempted to conduct more comprehensive analyses on the 
effect of citizenship directly. Early studies tended to agree that non-citizens are 
treated more harshly than U.S. citizens, which means that they are more likely to be 
incarcerated and to receive longer imprisonment sentences (Albonetti 1997; Mustard 
2001; Steffensmeir and Demuth 2000). These effects were conditioned on the 
defendant’s race and ethnicity. For instance, Albonetti (1997) found that in drug 
cases, for Black and Hispanics, but not for Whites, being a non-citizen significantly 
increases sentence severity.  
On the same path, Steffensmeir and Demuth (2000) found that non-citizen 
Hispanics were sentenced more harshly than non-citizen Blacks and especially 
Whites, but that the Hispanic-Black difference was trivial. Nevertheless, Mustard 
(2001) found that these differences could be almost entirely attributed to the 
differentiated use of downward departures. When the sample was limited only to 
cases sentenced within the guidelines limits, disparities no longer existed on the basis 
of citizenship. U.S. citizens were significantly more likely to receive downward 
departures, and at a larger magnitude.  
This last finding has been mostly confirmed by more recent studies (Johnson 
et al. 2008; Johnson & Betsinger 2009; Light 2010; Spohn 2005; Ulmer et al. 2010; 




citizens were 27% less likely to receive substantial assistance departures, and 15% 
and 5% shorter reductions for regular and substantial assistance departures, 
respectively, than citizens. Conversely, Johnson and Betsinger (2009) found that even 
though Hispanic non-citizens were less likely to receive substantial assistance 
departures, they were more likely to receive other types of downward departures.  
Recalling the discussion about the increasing trend of criminalization of 
immigration, it is not surprising that sentencing outcomes for non-citizens have 
experienced a noticeable fluctuation. This is confirmed by Light’s (2010) 
comprehensive assessment of the changes on ethnic disparities in punishment 
between 1992 and 2004. In the first place, this study found that the odds of being 
incarcerated have increased over time for Hispanics in comparison to Whites, 
especially between 2002 and 2004. However, this trend has largely been attributable 
to citizenship status trends. This means that while ethnic disparity has remained 
stable, disparities related to citizenship status have noticeably increased over time.  
For sentence length, this study found that ethnic disparity has reduced over 
time, especially between 2002 and 2004. In this case, citizenship status only partially 
explained this trend, with ethnicity itself still being significantly associated with 
sentence length disparity reduction over time. In the case of regular downward 
departures, the gap between Hispanics and Whites has decreased over time, but again 
this change was in part explained to the differential trending by citizenship status. Not 
surprisingly, citizenship status had no effect on the White or Black trend. Finally, a 
similar pattern in the opposite direction was found for substantial assistance 




increased. However, this trend was anew mostly attributable to the differential 
trending by citizenship status. 
Light’s (2010) study revealed a subtle pattern on non-citizen’s sentencing, 
portraying a picture in which Hispanic citizens tend to be more harshly sentenced 
especially since the beginning of this century. Nonetheless, this effect is more 
straightforward for incarceration, but far less clear for sentence length. Moreover, 
more recent studies exhibit a similar pattern (Demuth 2002; Johnson & Betsinger 
2009; Wolfe et al. 2011; Wu and DeLone 2012).  
For instance, Demuth (2002) compared drug cases sentencing outcomes for 
foreign legal and illegal residents and U.S. citizens, and found that the probability of 
incarceration was 30% and 44% greater for the former two groups compared to the 
latter. However, there were not significant disparities in sentence length. Logue 
(2009) also conducted a study that distinguished between Latino documented and 
undocumented immigrant drug trafficking offenders, and found that country of origin 
does have an impact on sentence length among non-citizens. Significant differences 
between non-citizen Mexicans and non-Mexican Latinos were evidenced, with the 
formers being more harshly sentenced than other Latinos.  
Consistent with this tendency, Shermer and Johnson (2010) found that non-
citizens were more likely to receive charge reductions, which the authors speculated 
was due to the fact that illegal aliens are often deported when prosecuted in federal 
courts. Spohn (2005), and Wu and Spohn (2010) focused only on three districts 
(Minnesota, Nebraska, and Southern Iowa) and found significant effects for 




assistance departures. Non-citizens were more likely to receive shorter sentences, but 
lower odds of receiving substantial assistance departures. Conversely, it is to note that 
Wu and DeLone (2012), in their analysis of 17 districts in Arizona, California, 
Florida, New Mexico, New York, and Texas, found that in the case of immigration 
offenses, non-citizens tended to receive longer sentences than citizens, and that early 
disposition departures did not have a particularly strong effect on sentence length 
reduction for non-citizens. These findings, largely corroborated by Hartley and 
Tillyer (2012), seem to contradict the main purpose of fast-track sentencing 
(accelerating non-citizen’s sentencing), which reveals the importance of investigating 
variations across jurisdictions characterized by heavy immigration caseloads. 
The studies conducted by Wolfe and colleagues (2011), and Iles (2009) 
highlight the relevance of differentiating between legal and illegal residents. 
Concretely, the former found that U.S. citizens were more likely to receive substantial 
departures (51%), compared to foreign legal residents (39%) and foreign illegal 
residents (14%). Conversely, in the case of fast-track departures, illegal aliens were 
more likely to receive this type of departure (54%), compared to legal aliens (20%) 
and citizens (5%). Interestingly, resident-legal and illegal aliens were 37%, and 9.5 
times more likely, respectively, to be imprisoned than U.S. citizens. However, there 
were no differences for resident-legal aliens compared to citizens in sentence length, 
but illegal aliens received prison terms 5% shorter than citizens. Illegal aliens were 
significantly more likely to be sent to prison if detained prior to trial.  
Even though Iles (2009) exclusively focused on the district court of the U.S. 




citizens of the Dominican Republic, tended to receive longer sentences than those 
imposed on U.S. citizens. The author suggested that Dominican citizenship can be 
seen as a proxy for danger to the society, with harsher sentences meted out in the 
interest of the community. 
Empirical Research on Contextual Variation in Punishment by Citizenship Status 
In general, differences across jurisdictions have motivated scholars to 
investigate contextual variations in punishment and their relationship with race and 
ethnicity. Researchers have found that the effects of race and ethnicity on sentencing 
varies across jurisdictions and are conditioned by contextual factors that shape the 
environment and culture of the judicial decision-making process (Britt 2000; Farrell 
& Ward 2011; Helms & Jacobs 2002; Jacobs & Carmichael 2002; Johnson 2005; 
Johnson 2006; Johnson et al. 2008; Kautt 2002; King, et al. 2010; Kramer & Ulmer 
1996; Ulmer & Johnson 2004; Ulmer 2005; Ulmer et al. 2010).  
At the federal level, several studies have found district and circuit variations 
in the effects of individual variables as well as the significant role of contextual 
factors on sentencing (Kautt 2002; Ulmer 2005; Ulmer et al. 2010). However, 
research on contextual variations in the punishment of non-citizens is scarce. Some 
authors (Johnson et al. 2008; Johnson & Betsinger 2009; Hartley and Tillyer 2012) 
have suggested that this is an aspect that warrants more research, whereas others 
(Hartley & Armendariz 2011; Spohn 2005; Wu & Spohn 2010) have examined 
differences across jurisdictions, but their analyses have been limited to a few districts 




Johnson, Ulmer and Kramer (2008) reported that citizenship status was one of 
the individual-level effects on departure lengths that varied significantly across 
federal districts. Johnson and Betsinger (2009) considered that Hispanic non-citizens 
are particularly likely to receive other downward departures because downward 
departures represent one structural mechanism for managing large immigration 
caseloads in Southwestern districts, by providing more discretion to prosecutors and 
offenders to obtain reductions in the severity of the punishment and, consequently, 
leverage for the early termination of criminal proceedings. This suggests that it is 
likely that non-citizens may be treated differently across jurisdictions. In their 
analysis of immigration offenses, Hartley and Tillyer (2012) also reported that cases 
prosecuted in border jurisdictions received increased sentence lengths compared to 
non-border districts, and that U.S. citizens were more likely to receive shorter 
sentences in all districts except West Texas.  
A comparison between the studies conducted by Spohn (2005) and Wu and 
Spohn (2010), and Hartley and Armendariz (2011), seems to confirm this assertion. 
For instance, the two former studies did not find consistently significant effects for 
citizenship on sentencing across the three jurisdictions that were examined 
(Minnesota, Nebraska, and Southern Iowa), and only at the aggregate level for 
sentence length and substantial assistance departures. It is fair to recall that these 
districts are not characterized by large recent immigration trends. Conversely, Hartley 
and Armendariz (2011) conducted their study in three districts heavily affected by 
large immigration influxes, such as Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, and 




sentence length for drug trafficking offenses, it is interesting to note from this study 
the numerous significant varied effects that citizenship status had on sentencing 
outcomes for different types of drugs across jurisdictions.  
 A review of the literature on the role of citizenship on federal sentencing 
reveals an increasing accumulation in the last ten years. However, the suggested close 
relationship between immigration pressures and sentencing has still not been 
completely examined. Moreover, an analysis of the possible contextual variations in 
the punishment of non-citizens and its relationship with immigration and its 
enforcement is pending. Some studies have compared sentencing outcome across 
jurisdictions, but the analyses have been limited to few locations, and they have not 
explicitly included contextual variables. No study has explicitly addressed the 
contextual impact of immigrant population concentration and enforcement on 
sentencing. The current study expands on sentencing research by examining 
contextual variations in the punishment of Hispanic defendants, with a focus on 
citizenship status. The inclusion of the idea of immigration threat as a key element of 




Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
 The blurring of the conceptual and practical boundaries between immigration 
enforcement and criminal law has led scholars to quote the terms crimmigration law 
(Stumpf 2011) and immigrationization of criminal law (Frey & Zhao 2011). Although 
this is a tangible phenomenon, it is not completely clear whether the criminal law is 
expanding into the realm of immigration law or vice versa (Sklansky 2012). 
Immigration enforcement and the criminal justice system are interchangeably and 
conveniently used to target criminal aliens (Stumpf 2011). In this regard, the 
philosophical boundaries between the traditional categories of law have become more 
unclear and driven mostly by practical considerations rather than theoretical or 
thoughtful reasoning (Ortiz 2011).  
This perspective is deeply marked by skepticism of formal legal categories, 
their stability and coherence, and by the distrust in the idea that official discretion 
could and should be controlled (Sklansky 2012). From this, it follows that the 
reduction of discretion through formal legal techniques, such as sentencing 
guidelines, is at least a naïve approach. Savelsberg (1992) has argued that sentencing 
guidelines cannot overcome substantial societal and political conditions that feed 
disparities because they ignore the sociology of modern societies, characterized by 
bargaining rather than the rigid application of formal rules.  
Law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and immigration officials are 
encouraged to see criminal and immigration laws as different kinds of tools to be used 
conveniently according to the circumstances (Sklansky 2012). Moreover, the war on 




substantive issues not because of their inherent importance, but instead because they 
are using process as an instrumental tool (Martinez 2008). This instrumental use of 
criminal and immigration laws and enforcements is conceptualized by Sklanksky 
(2012) as a prototypical case of what he refers to as ad-hoc instrumentalism. 
According to this perspective, in some cases, the tools work best in combination, as 
when an individual suspected of being in the country illegally is arrested for traffic 
offenses and transferred to immigration authorities. In other cases, immigration 
enforcement can be used to strengthen criminal justice when a non-citizen is denied 
bail because of an immigration requirement. Finally, in other cases, criminal 
prosecutions are used to achieve immigration objectives, by convicting non-citizens 
of crimes that trigger mandatory deportation, or by promoting plea agreements that 
include a waiver of claims that might otherwise block deportation. In this latter case, 
the criminal justice system has been restructured to allow for agency control and 
promotion of immigration objectives within the criminal prosecution (Eagly 2010). 
Overall, this theoretical standpoint conceives that the criminal justice system could be 
used as a mechanism for targeting non-citizens and deporting them. 
The Federal Sentencing Commission has determined that courts are prohibited 
from using, among other factors, defendant’s national origin as a determinant for their 
decisions (USSG § 5H1.10). Nevertheless, Congress incorporated (8 U.S.C. § 
1228c5) deportation into federal plea bargaining and sentencing by authorizing the 
stipulation of deportability as part of a plea bargain (Chin 2011). This means that 
although citizenship status solely by itself is not to be considered as a legal 




only possible for non-citizens, in practice, a differential treatment for non-citizens at 
sentencing is justified on the grounds of their expedited removal from the country.  
It should be noted that according to the United States Code (Title, 8, Chapter 
12, Subchapter II, § 1231), an alien who is imprisoned is not to be deported until the 
completion of his or her sentence. Nevertheless, there are a couple of exceptions 
established by the same law. An alien may be removed before the completion of the 
sentence if he or she was convicted for a non-violent offense (excluding any offense 
related to smuggling or harboring of aliens, or most of those considered aggravated 
felony), or the removal is appropriate and in the best interests of the United States. 
However, these exceptions are only applicable in those cases in which the alien is 
under the custody of the Attorney General. 
The review conducted in the introductory part of this paper revealed that 
deportation has become an unavoidable consequence for almost every non-citizen 
convicted for any federal crime. Therefore, under these conditions, non-citizens do 
not have enough bargaining leeway to negotiate any concession from prosecutors and 
judges (Taylor and Wright 2002). In this context, even though the U.S. sentencing 
guidelines allow courts to mitigate a sentence based on a defendant’s agreement not 
to contest deportation, it is likely that more frequently they use it as a reason for 
sentencing within but at the lower end of the guidelines grid (Chin 2011).   
The fact that judges may rely on the intrinsic deportability status of non-
citizens to mete out their sentences can be explained through the lens of Albonetti’s 
(1991) uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution perspective. According to this 




that surrounds the work of courtroom workgroup actors. In this sense, judges would 
rely on stereotypes that link defendant’s individual’s traits and case processing 
outcomes to assess the defendant’s disposition toward future criminal activity. 
Therefore, in an attempt to achieve rationality—a bounded rationality—in their 
decisions, judges make satisfying causal attributions about the crime and the offender 
based on societal stereotypes.  
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer (1998) elaborated on this standpoint and 
formulated a three-focal concerns perspective to more specifically explain it. The 
first, offender’s blameworthiness, is a legally considered factor that indicates that the 
defendant’s potential punishment increases depending on the offender’s culpability 
and the degree of injury caused. The second, protection of the community, focuses on 
the need to incapacitate the offender or to deter would-be offenders. The third, 
practical implications of sentencing decisions, refers to both organization and 
individual factors that come into play in sentencing decisions.  
The first two focal concerns provide a more specific theoretical support for 
explaining the consideration of deportation on the punishment of Hispanic non-
citizens. In relation to offender’s blameworthiness, judges may consider Hispanic 
non-citizens doubly culpable because they violated the law of a country that 
welcomed them and in exchange they became a burden for the nation (Demleitner & 
Sands 2002; Wolfe et al 2011).6 Moreover, Hispanic non-citizens are commonly 
                                                 
6 To illustrate, in United States v. Onwuemene, the district court explicitly said that “The other thing 
that I feel that warrants imposition at the high end of the guideline range: You are not a citizen of this 
country. This country was good enough to allow you to come in here and to confer upon you ... a 
number of the benefits of this society, form of government, and its opportunities, and you repay that 





perceived as more delinquent-prone, in spite of the empirical evidence in contrary 
(Hagan & Palloni 1999; Sampson 2008; Stowell et al. 2009). This may be tied to the 
augmented perceived flight risk of non-citizens (Schlesinger 2005).  
Nonetheless, in relation to the second focal concern, judges may consider that 
the protection of the community is best achieved by accelerating the removal of 
Hispanic non-citizen offenders from the U.S. territory rather than imposing lengthier 
incarceration terms. Deportation may be seen as a powerful mechanism for 
deterrence, retribution and, most notably, incapacitation (Ortiz 2011). In this sense, 
by imposing shorter imprisonment terms on Hispanic non-citizens, judges may at the 
same time speed up their banishment from the country by accelerating their 
deportation proceedings, and give the message that non-citizen would-be offenders 
will be subjected to expedited removals (Hartley & Tillyer 2012). 
The practically unavoidable link between deportation and lack of citizenship 
may be taken by sentencing judges as a source of certainty regarding the future of a 
Hispanic non-citizen defendant. These considerations lead to the following: 
Hypothesis 1: To expedite deportation, after controlling for legal 
considerations, Hispanic non-citizens will receive shorter sentences than Hispanic 
citizens. 
Empirical reasons to expect significant contextual variations in the 
punishment of Hispanic non-citizens in relation to the differentiated contextual 
emphasis placed on the removal of immigrants from the U.S. territory were provided 
in the introductory part of this paper. Likewise, this expectation is also supported by 




work and their preferences and expectations are likely to be substantially conditioned 
by the surrounding cultural, political, and economic conditions (Myers & Talarico 
1987). According to a contextual perspective on sentencing, the sentencing process is 
influenced by the political, social, and organizational context of the court (Dixon 
1995). Moreover, the social worlds perspectives (Ulmer 1997) posits that in practice 
externally imposed sentencing standards vary in their usage and application by local 
relationships and informal decision-making criteria (Kautt 2002).  
The criminal law varies with the societal context in its relation to the political 
sector and substantive societal conditions influence its use and interpretation 
(Savelsberg 1992). The role of individual and case processing factors is likely to be 
conditioned by the court context (Britt 2000; Kautt 2002). The focal concerns 
perspective also hypothesizes that their meaning, emphasis and interpretation is local 
(Ulmer & Johnson 2004). Ulmer (2005) explained that the courts work as 
communities based on participant’s shared workplace and interdependent working 
relations among key sponsoring agencies. The distinctive organizational cultures and 
relationships of workgroup courtrooms establish formal and informal case 
processings and sentencing norms. The influence of external organizations and 
externally imposed policies is a function of those organizational patterns.  
In addition, Quinney’s Social Reality of Crime perspective (1975) also 
supports the differentiated impact of contextual conditions on sentencing. According 
to this viewpoint, the application of the criminal law varies according to the extent to 
which the behaviors of the powerless conflict with the interests of those in power. In 




are more threatened. Local conditions influence how the criminal law is applied. 
Communities vary in their expectations of law enforcement and the administration of 
justice, and its application is influenced by the visibility of offenses in a community 
and by the public’s norms about reporting possible violations.  
This theoretical framework is also coherent with group threat perspectives. In 
Blumer’s (1958) group prejudice perspective, the dominant group shares a feeling of 
apprehension that the subordinate group is threatening. Large increases in a dissimilar 
minority group over a relatively brief period will lead to social and economic conflict 
with dominant groups and the intensification of social control efforts to maintain the 
status quo (Caravelis et al. 2011; Jacobs et al. 2005; Skitka et al. 2006; Steffensmeier 
& Demuth 2001; Wang 2012).  
Cross-national differences in incarceration rates are significantly explained as 
a function of internal racial or ethnic threats (Jacobs & Kleban 2003). Similarly, 
realistic and symbolic threats and inter-group anxiety are significant psychological 
factors explaining attitudes toward immigrants (Stephan et al. 1999). Indeed, the 
perceived size more so than the actual size of the undocumented immigrant 
population is a particularly salient predictor of perceptions of this group as a criminal 
threat (Wang 2012). Moreover, Johnson and colleagues (2011) found that both 
perceived and objective ethnic threats are significant predictors of public support for 
use of ethnicity in punishment. The differentiated magnitude of recent Hispanic 
immigration trends across jurisdictions may also explain the contextually 




This theoretical framework allows us to formulate the hypotheses that 
constitute the core argument of the present paper. First, the review conducted in the 
introductory part reveals that the nationwide immigration policy approach underwent 
in the last two decades emphasizes the extended use of deportation as a means of 
social control for convicted non-citizens. Nonetheless, this emphasis is likely to vary 
across jurisdictions not only because the influx and presence of Hispanic immigrants 
is different by location, but also because local policymakers have adopted more or 
less severe immigration enforcement approaches. These policy choices are also likely 
to be a function of the local public’s hegemonic opinions and attitudes toward 
Hispanic immigrants and enforcement, as well as the local political standing of 
Hispanics. This contextually differentiated emphasis on the deportation of Hispanic 
immigrants is likely to bring about state variations in the punishment of Hispanic 
non-citizens. Therefore, these standpoints lead to the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Sentencing severity for Hispanic non-citizens will vary 
significantly across states. 
Hypothesis 3: Hispanic non-citizens will receive shorter sentences in states 
that place more emphasis on deporting non-citizens than in those states that place less 
emphasis on it. 
Hypothesis 4: Hispanic non-citizens will receive shorter sentences in states 
with greater growth in their Hispanic populations. 
In summary, this paper is guided by contemporary sentencing and judicial 
decision-making theory, and proposes an analysis that includes the contextually 




immigration enforcement as fundamental factors to explain sentencing outcomes for 
non-citizen defendants. This research project purports to demonstrate that Hispanic 
non-citizen defendant’s sentencing is significantly influenced by immigration 
determinants. This influence is expected to vary across jurisdictions and be 




Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
Data 
This study uses secondary data from the Monitoring of Federal Criminal 
Sentences Series database of the USSC maintained by Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR 25424). The subjects in this research are 
criminal defendants sentenced pursuant to provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act 
(SRA) of 1984 and reported to the USSC during FY 2008. Only the cases in which a 
presentence investigation report are included because the USSC recommends 
analyzing only cases where this report was completed due to missing information on 
key variables (Hartley & Tillyer 2012). Capital punishment cases are also excluded 
because of their exceptionality. Given the nature of the proposed study and 
hypotheses, the sample is limited to Hispanic defendants only.  
With these constraints, the resulting sample consisted of 26,323 observations.7 
However, since this study only considers those defendants sentenced to prison, the 
final sample consists of 25,927 subjects. These data were restricted to 50 states within 
the United States, and the District of Columbia.8 This dataset includes data about 
defendant’s citizenship and ethnicity, as well as court characteristics, sentencing 
                                                 
7 After limiting the data, the final sample consisted of 26,325 observations. Nonetheless, there were 
two observations with missing information on criminal history only that were listwise deleted. These 
defendants were two non-Black and male non-citizens, aged 31 and 34, with financial dependents, 
awarded no departure, without post-high school education, with only one count of conviction, one of 
them denied bail, not sentenced at trial, with 24 adjusted minimum months of incarceration 
recommended by sentencing guidelines, and finally sentenced for immigration and drugs offenses, and 
to 24 and 30 months of incarceration, respectively. 
8 The level-two units for this study are states because the proposed contextual variables are measured 




outcomes, and criminal caseloads, making it an appropriate dataset for conducting 
research on sentencing disparities associated with Hispanic non-citizen offenders. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the present study is sentence length. This is a 
continuous variable measured as the natural logarithm of the number of months of 
incarceration that the offender was sentenced to serve in prison, because according to 
prior research the distribution of sentence length is highly skewed (Hartley & Tillyer 
2012; Iles 2009; Shermer & Johnson 2010). However, since the distribution of the 
logged dependent variable was still moderately skewed to the left, all the zeros were 
set to .9. The distributions of the original and logged dependent variable are displayed 
below in Figures 1 and 2. On the other hand, sentence length models only comprise 
those cases that received an incarceration sentence, which has led researchers to 
include a selection bias correction factor (e.g., Ulmer & Johnson 2004; Johnson 
2006). For the present study, a Heckman hazard ratio is included in all the purported 
analyses and models. This new variable was calculated using the Heckman two-step 
command in Stata 12, and then included in each model.9  
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
                                                 
9 The accuracy of this method and its likelihood to produce high collinearity has been questioned 
(Kautt 2002). In this regard, the inclusion of this factor was previously tested by creating the Heckman 
correction by using the mentioned procedure in Stata 12, and then comparing models with and without 
it. This comparison was done by examining the condition number calculated using a command in Stata 
12 (cndnmb3) as an indicator of severe collinearity issues, with a coefficient of 30 or more considered 
problematic. In this case, the impact of this correction factor on the condition number of the tested 
ordinary least squares model was low. In fact, the condition number without the correction factor was 
11.2 and with the correction was 11.3. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the correction hazard 
had a very influential effect on the main individual independent variable, which is citizenship status. In 
the models that included this correction, citizenship status was always statistically significant, but 





The main independent variable at the individual level is citizenship status, 
which is measured with a dummy variable indicating whether a defendant is a non-
U.S. citizen. The third hypothesis is referred to the magnitude of the state’s contextual 
emphasis on deportation and is tested with two independent variables. First, a dummy 
variable measures whether a state has adopted a fast-track sentencing program and/or 
signed a 287(g) agreement. The list of states that have adopted these programs is 
included below in Table 1. This information comes from the Attorney Generals’ 
memo of early disposition programs re-authorization (Department of Justice 2008), 
and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement website.10  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Second, public’s attitudes toward deportation of illegal immigrants are 
measured at the state level with a proportion score elaborated using the CBS 
News/New York Times Monthly Poll, May 2007 (ICPSR 23444). This dataset 
consists of a random digit-dialing telephone interview survey conducted between 
May 18, and May 23, 2007, of a stratified representative sample of 1,132 respondents, 
with African Americans being oversampled (17%). After limiting the sample to those 
cases in which the information was complete for the variable of interest, the final 
simple consisted of 1,037 subjects. This variable was constructed from the following 
question asked in that survey: “Should illegal immigrants be prosecuted and deported 
for being in the U.S. illegally, or shouldn’t they?” Then, a percentage coefficient was 
                                                 





assigned to each state by calculating the proportion of respondents that favored 
deportation compared to those in each state that did not.11  
Three variables are used to test the group threat theory (hypothesis four): 
immigration caseload pressure, Hispanic population, and Hispanic political 
representation. First, immigration offenses caseload pressure is measured as the 
average number of immigration cases sentenced in a state12 in a year divided by the 
number of authorized judgeships, and then divided by 100 to make a more 
meaningful interpretation of the results. Each one unit change in immigration 
caseload therefore represents an increase of 100 immigration cases per judge in the 
state. Data on authorized judgeships come from the United States Courts website,13 
and the number of cases comes from the main sentencing dataset.  
Second, the estimated proportion of unauthorized immigrants as of 2007 is 
included. The Pew Hispanic Center (2011) provides state-level data of the estimated 
unauthorized immigrant population, and the U.S. Census Bureau provides data of the 
2007 total population estimates (2007). This variable is measured as the proportion of 
unauthorized immigrants compared to the total population in each state. The estimates 
were calculated by the Pew Hispanic Center using the “residual method,” by which a 
demographic estimate of the legal foreign-born-population is subtracted from the total 
foreign born population, and the remainder is the source of population estimates of 
unauthorized immigrants. The official source of data used to calculate these estimates 
                                                 
11 Even though the representativeness of the responses for most states was very low, it was possible to 
assign a coefficient to each one since all of them had at least two respondents, with an average of 20 
respondents per state. States with five or less respondents were the following: Alaska, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
12 This variable is also measured at the state level, given that all the other contextual variables are 
measured at this same level. 





was the Current Population Survey. All 2007 estimates are based on the average share 
of the national unauthorized immigration population for 2006-2008. 
Finally, the Hispanic political representation is measured as the proportion of 
Hispanic legislators in each state Congress. This variable corresponds also to 
hypothesis four because a larger number of Hispanic legislators is partially indicative 
of a larger presence of Hispanics in the state. Though, it may be considered also a 
moderating factor because a larger Hispanic political representation may also be 
interpreted as indicative of more cohesive and settled Hispanic communities in that 
location. This information is obtained from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures web page for year 2009.14 
Control Variables 
Based on prior research on sentencing disparities and contextual variation in 
punishment at the federal level (Johnson et al. 2008; Kautt 2002; Shermer & Johnson 
2010; Ulmer et al. 2010), this study includes individual legal and extra-legal control 
variables. Gender is a dummy variable that codes males with one and females with 
zero. Age is measured as a continuous variable for defendant’s age in years at the 
time of sentencing. Education is measured as a dummy variable indicating whether a 
defendant has some post-high school education or not, with high school education or 
less, coded as the reference category with a zero. A dummy variable, coded one if the 
offender had any financial dependents and zero if otherwise, is also included. Race is 
                                                 
14 http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legisdata/latino-legislators-overview.aspx. The last 
available and completely reported data on the proportion of Hispanic legislators per state congress is of 
year 2009. However, these data fairly represents the Hispanic political representation for year 2008 
because they refer to legislators elected in that year and on duty throughout 2009. Moreover, only the 
states of New Jersey and Virginia held legislative elections in 2009, which took place in November of 




measured with a dummy variable that indicates whether a defendant is African 
American or not, with the former coded one and the latter, zero.  
The type of crime is measured with a series of dummy variables for 
immigration,15 others,16 and drug offenses,17 with the latter as the reference 
category.18 This categorization is justified because 51% of the data correspond to 
immigration offenses, and 35% to drug offenses, and in the case of non-citizens these 
categories comprise 63% and 28% of the sample, respectively.  
Downward and upward departures are also included as control variables, and 
are measured with four dummy indicators, with no departures as the reference 
category. Upward departures include all the categories that fall above the guidelines 
range. Downward departures are classified into regular downward departures,19 
substantial assistance departures,20 and early disposition departures.21   
                                                 
15 Immigration offenses comprise two broad categories of crimes: smuggling, transporting, or 
harboring an unlawful alien, and unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States. Unfortunately, 
federal sentencing data do not provide this information disaggregated into these two categories.  
16 Even though the type of offenses included within the category of others may not be theoretically 
coherent, the very few cases corresponding to each one as well as the main focus of the present study 
makes it preferable to proceed in this way. This category includes the following offenses: murder, 
manslaughter, kidnaping, sexual abuse, assault, bank robbery, arson, burglary, auto theft, larceny, 
fraud, embezzlement, forgery, bribery, tax offenses, money laundering, racketeering, gambling, civil 
rights offenses, pornography prostitution, offenses in prisons, crimes against the administration of 
justice, environmental offenses, national defense offenses, antitrust violations, food and drug offenses, 
traffic violations and other offenses.  
17 Drug offenses include, according to the federal sentencing dataset codebook, trafficking, 
communication facilities, and simple possession. 
18 This decision was mainly due to the high negative collinearity (-.77) between immigration and drug 
offenses, which increased the likelihood of committing a Type II error in the case of the immigration 
offenses estimate. 
19 Regular downward departures are regulated under the Federal rule 5K2. In these cases, the judge 
retains all the discretion to decide whether or not a downward departure could be granted in the 
presence of some extenuating circumstances. This category also included for this study all the other 
types of downward departures not included in the remaining categories.  
20 Substantial assistance departures are regulated under Federal Rule 5K1.1 and is granted to 
defendants considered to have provided substantial assistance to law enforcement. In the first place, 
these departures require a formal motion from the prosecutor, but in the end is the judge who 
determines whether or not they should be conceded.  




A dummy variable is also included to measure whether the case involved 
multiple counts of conviction or not, with the latter as the reference category. Pre-
sentence detention is also measured with a dummy variable coded one if the 
defendant was detained and zero otherwise. Mode of conviction is measured with a 
dummy variable indicating whether the offender was convicted through trial or guilty 
plea, with the latter as the reference category. 
Regarding criminal history, according to Engen and Gainey (2000), 
sentencing research in jurisdictions where a guidelines system has been implemented 
should include the presumptive guideline sentence because the relation between crime 
seriousness, criminal history, and sentence length is not linear. The presumptive 
sentence is equal to the minimum months of incarceration recommended by the 
sentencing guidelines capped at 470,22 although the defendant’s criminal history is 
also included because prior research suggests that it carries additional weight beyond 
the presumptive sentence (Johnson et al. 2008). This variable is measured as the 
guideline criminal history score, ranging from 0 to 6 (6, the most serious). There is 
not a high correlation between these two variables (r = .12). A thorough coding 
scheme summary of the dependent and independent variables is included in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Analytical Approach 
The analytical approach to be developed relies on the procedures employed in 
similar previous studies (e.g., Hartley & Tillyer 2012; Johnson et al. 2008; Johnson & 
                                                 
22 It is to be noted that the presumptive sentence was also logged in order to ensure normality in the 
error terms and keep consistency with the dependent variable. As in the case of sentence length, this 




Betsinger 2009; Kautt 2002). The approach that best fits the theoretical basis and 
predictions of the present study relies on the use of two-level hierarchical linear 
models. The main focus of this paper is not exclusively on the impact of individual-
level variables on sentencing within nested data. In these cases, the recommended 
approach is to control for inter-district variation by including a set of dummy 
variables for each district (e.g., Johnson & Betsinger 2009).  
The theoretical predictions that guide the present study, however, mostly refer 
to cross-level interactions that require not only removing interclass correlation due to 
group dependency, but including variables at the state level to explain between-group 
variations. In this case, the appropriate and recommended technique is hierarchical 
linear models (Johnson 2010; Kautt 2002; Ulmer & Johnson 2004). Unlike ordinary 
least square models, multilevel models allow not only to account for statistical 
dependencies between data clusters, but also to include information from different 
levels of analysis (Johnson 2010). This avoids the violation of essential assumptions 
of linear regression, such as homoscedasticity and independence of error terms, and 
allows for the interaction between contextual and individual variables. 
The analysis takes the following steps. First, hypothesis number one is tested 
using an ordinary least squares model. For this particular part of the analysis, district 
variation is controlled for by including a series of dummy variables for each district. 
This analysis comprehends three progressive models.23 The first includes only 
citizenship status, the second adds legal control variables, and finally, the third 
includes all the remaining variables.  
                                                 




Afterwards, the basic assumption of hierarchical linear models that exist there 
correlated errors between clusters is tested, in this case between states. Although 
several studies have shown that this is the case for federal sentencing data (e.g., 
Johnson & Betsinger 2009; Kautt 2002), the second hypothesis is tested by estimating 
a two-level unconditional model and calculating the interclass correlation coefficient 
to investigate the amount of variance explained by between-group differences 
(Johnson 2010). This procedure will allow for estimating the relative amount of 
sentencing variation that occurs both at the individual and state levels of analysis.  
After doing this, all the variables are grand-mean centered and added to the 
following models. Subsequently, a random intercept model that includes only 
individual-level variables is run, then a random intercept model that also includes the 
state-level contextual variables, and then a random coefficient model with specific 
random effects. Finally, this study relies on cross-model interaction models to test the 
main hypotheses of the present study. Nonetheless, preliminary analyses are 
conducted in order to test for misspecification, determine possible collinearity 
problems, and pursue the most robust and stable estimators (Johnson 2010).24 
                                                 
24 Effect sizes were calculated for each model. However, none of these effects were different than zero 
except for the presumptive sentence. Thus, given that they did not provide any meaningful additional 




Chapter 5:  Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
 From observing Tables 3 and 4 included below, it can be seen that among the 
full sample, 77% are Hispanic non-citizens. Interestingly, 96% of them were detained 
prior to trial, in contrast to only 73% among Hispanic citizens. This seems to provide 
descriptive evidence that the perceived flight risk is more heavily weighted by federal 
judges in the case of non-citizens. In addition, both Hispanic citizens and non-citizens 
are at first sight similarly situated in respect to guidelines departures because in both 
cases approximately 60% of them were sentenced within the guidelines. However, a 
closer examination reveals noteworthy differences. First, regarding regular downward 
departures, 19% of citizens received them compared to 15% of non-citizens. 
Concerning substantial assistance and early disposition departures the differences are 
more germane. For instance, 18% of citizens received substantial assistance 
departures compared to only 6% of non-citizens. In the case of early disposition 
departures, 19% of non-citizens were awarded this type of departure compared to 
only 4% of citizens. These differences may not only be attributable to sentencing 
features linked to citizenship status, but also due to contextual variations.25  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 A very significant aspect that emerges from the descriptive statistics is the 
prevalence of the type of offense by citizenship status. For instance, Hispanic citizens 
comprise 13% of the immigration offenses, compared to 64% in the case of Hispanic 
                                                 
25 It is to be noted that early disposition departures are an outcome that corresponds mostly to the state 




non-citizens. Conversely, drug offenses corresponded to 60% of the former group, 
while only 28% of the latter. This may to a great extent explain why citizens received 
on average lengthier sentences (61 months) than non-citizens (35 months), since 
immigration offenses receive shorter sentence lengths than drug crimes.  
 In reference to the contextual variables, it is to be noted that more than half of 
the states (53%) have signed either one or both of fast-track sentencing or 287(g) 
programs. In the case of attitudes toward deportation, there is a moderate prevalence 
favoring it (.65 in a 0 to 1 scale). Regarding immigration caseload pressure, the most 
significant datum is that there is relatively large variation and skewedness to the right, 
which means that a few number of states share the huge majority of immigration 
offenses. For instance, only one standard deviation below the mean falls below zero, 
whereas adding three standard deviations to the mean (1.77) is still far below the 
maximum value (2.91).  
In the case of unauthorized immigrants, it is noteworthy that the percentage of 
unauthorized immigrants is relatively low, with an average of 3% and a maximum of 
just 9%. The variability in percentage terms is also not that large, with a standard 
deviation of 2%. Finally, the presence of Hispanic legislators in each state Congress 
remains relatively low in the current days with a mean of just 4%, although it seems 
again that a few states comprise a huge presence of Hispanic legislators, given that 
there is a maximum of 44% and a standard deviation larger than the mean (8%). 
As part of the descriptive analyses, correlations among the independent 
variables were also examined. The purpose of this procedure was to determine 




with high collinearity is the occurrence of a Type II error due to excessively large 
standard errors. Table 5 displays a correlation table for the individual level variables. 
None of them seems to be indicative of multicollinearity issues, with moderate 
correlations for immigration offenses and citizenship status (.43) and the presumptive 
sentence (.44). After running preliminary models, no issues regarding 
multicollinearity were evident from the results.26  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Furthermore, Table 6 displays a correlation table only for the level two 
contextual variables. In this case, there are noticeable cases of severe 
multicollinearity issues. There is a huge correlation between Hispanic political 
representation and immigration caseload pressure (.86), and estimated unauthorized 
immigrants (.53), as well as between fast-track/287(g) programs and estimated 
unauthorized immigrants (.57). As mentioned above, the main problem of a high 
collinearity is the likelihood of committing a Type II error. Several preliminary 
models were run with each of these variables separately, and then with a progressive 
combination of all of them. These diagnostics also included likelihood-ratio tests to 
determine the specific contribution of each variable to the model. The only variable 
that was significant in all the models and tests was Hispanic political representation. 
Immigration caseload pressure was the other statistically significant variable in the 
likelihood-ratio tests, but not in the models in which Hispanic political representation 
was included. Moreover, the inclusion of that variable in the more complex models 
produced instability and model fitting problems. On the other hand, including all the 
                                                 
26 Additional multicollinearity diagnostics using variance inflation factors were conducted and none of 




other variables did not lead to substantial modifications in the effect and significance 
of these and the other individual-level variables, and did not affect the accuracy and 
stability of the models. Therefore, all of contextual variables except immigration 
caseload pressure are included in the definitive reported models.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Results from Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
The ordinary least square regressions in this study are used to test hypothesis 
one.27 As mentioned above, these analyses were conducted progressively. Results 
from these models are shown in Table 7, and they seem to provide apparent support 
for that hypothesis. From the first model that only includes citizenship status without 
any controls, it emerges that Hispanic non-citizens were likely to receive on average 
sentences that were 88% shorter than Hispanic citizens, with this result being 
statistically significant. It should be noted that this model only explained 29% of the 
variation in the dependent variable, which in comparison to the following more 
complete models is notoriously low.28  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
After including legal control variables, the effect of citizenship status 
dramatically decreased, even though it retained statistical significance at the .001 
level. According to this model, being a Hispanic non-citizen was associated with 
sentence lengths that were on average 6% shorter compared to Hispanic citizens. It is 
                                                 
27 District 81 (Oklahoma East) was used as the reference category. Moreover, to comply with the 
homoscedasticity assumption, robust standard errors were specified. Finally, although the relation 
between sentence length and age was significantly curvilinear, in favor of parsimony and consistency 
across models, and given that this is only a control variable, the squared term for age is omitted from 
the finally reported models.  
28 A model that did not include the selection hazard rate and the district controls explained only 5% of 




noteworthy from this model that individual legal variables had a significant effect on 
sentence length. Particularly, a 1% increase in the presumptive sentence was 
associated with a .74% increase in sentence length. All of the downward and upward 
departures had also noticeable and significant effects on sentence length, with 
defendants who received regular, substantial assistance, and early disposition 
downward departures being sentenced on average to 41%, 58% and 58%, 
respectively, shorter sentences than those who did not receive these benefits. Those 
who received upward departures were sentenced to 75% lengthier sentences, on 
average. This model explained 86% of the variance in the dependent variable. 
Finally, the comparison between the second and third models reveals that the 
apparently large effect of citizenship status on sentencing was mostly accounted for 
by the legal control variables because its effect did not experience any modification 
once the extra-legal variables were included. Still, that variable retained statistical 
significance at the .001 level. None of the other control variables suffered any 
important modification in their magnitude, directionality, and statistical significance. 
The last model explained 86% of the variation in the dependent variable. 29 
Results from Two-Level Unconditional HLM Model 
 Table 8 presents results from the two-level unconditional model of sentence 
length. The results, in particular the interclass correlation coefficient, indicate that 
about 9% of the total variance was attributable to between state variations. This 
means that the majority of the variation on sentence length was mainly due to 
                                                 
29 Model diagnostics revealed that there were three influential observations with high leverage over the 
results. Nonetheless, none of the coefficients suffered any substantial variation in their directionality, 
magnitude, and significance once these observations were removed. Thus, they were kept in all the 




individual level factors, which is also reflected in the magnitude of the variance 
coefficients for each level of analysis. However, the size of this variation is similar 
and even larger than what has been shown in previous studies of federal sentencing. 
For instance, Kautt (2002) found that level two (district) and level three (circuit) 
factors explained 7% and 3% of the variance, respectively. Also, Ulmer and 
colleagues (2010) found that 6% of the variance in sentence length existed between 
district courts. This means that the amount of variance attributable to the second level 
of analysis in this study is consistent with what has been found in prior research and 
constitutes an adequate baseline for the subsequent stages of analysis. 
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
Results from the Two-Level Random Intercept Model: Individual Level Fixed Effects 
 This model is the logical next step in the analysis because it essentially 
signifies the inclusion of individual level variables. Results from this model are 
depicted in Table 9. The inclusion of level-one variables explained approximately 
85% of the total variance at the individual level, and also explained 92% of the 
variance between states.30 This means that most of the variation at the state level was 
explained by the impact of individual level variables.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Looking at the fixed effects, the results are practically similar to those of the 
ordinary least square model, with the legal individual level variables having the more 
meaningful effects on sentence length. The presumptive recommended sentence, 
criminal history, and the guidelines departures played the major roles in explaining 
                                                 




sentence length for Hispanic defendants. Regarding citizenship status, Hispanic non-
citizens received on average shorter (6%) sentences than Hispanic citizens. 
Importantly, this effect was statistically significant at the .01 level.  
Results from the Two-Level Random Intercept Model: Contextual Level Fixed Effects 
The next step in the analysis requires the inclusion of level-two variables. 
Results from this model are presented in Table 10. The inclusion of these four new 
variables explained an additional 2% in the variation at the state level (94%),31 
although including these variables did not produce any modification in the direction, 
magnitude and significance of any of the individual level variables, counting 
citizenship status.  
Among the four contextual variables, only Hispanic political representation 
showed a statistically significant negative impact on sentence length. Even though the 
magnitude of the coefficient may be considered low, it exerted a meaningful effect on 
the dependent variable, with a one unit (%) increase in the percentage of Hispanic 
legislators in a state congress associated with a 1% reduction in sentence length.32  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
                                                 
31 This is a Bryk/Raudenbush R-squared value calculated by Stata. 
32 In order to test the existence of influential level two outliers, model diagnostics were conducted. 
From these analyses it emerged that the states of Texas, Arizona, and New York seemed to exert great 
influence on the results. Alternative analyses were conducted with and without these states and the 
only somewhat noteworthy modification was that the statistical significance of citizenship status was 
downgraded from a .001 to a .05 level in the model without Texas, which seems to be a minor change. 
Moreover, the directionality of the effect was the same, and the magnitude experienced a small 
reduction (from -.06 to -.04). Therefore, the finally reported models include all the level-2 units. 
However, a caveat that should be mentioned is the relative influence of the selection bias hazard rate in 
the results of Texas. Ordinary least squares regressions with and without the correction factor were run 
only for this state and in the first case being a non-citizen had a statistical significant (p = .000) 
negative effect on sentence length, whereas in the latter case this significance was completely lost (p = 
.841). This is likely to be linked to the fact that in the study sample the great majority (40%) of those 




Results from the Two-Level Full Random Coefficient Model 
 This can be considered the final full model with random effects, prior to the 
examination of cross-level interactions. Results from this model are depicted in Table 
11. Even though the main focus of this paper is on the fixed effects of the model, a 
brief commentary about the selection of the random effects could be relevant. In the 
specification of a multilevel model it is recommended to use an unstructured 
covariance matrix because it places no constrains in the covariances between the 
effects themselves and the constant. First, the hypotheses of this paper merited the 
inclusion of citizenship status as a random effects. Likewise, this effect was 
significant in the likelihood-ratio tests. Second, the tests revealed that most of the 
individual random effects were statistically significant. In this case, the only random 
effects of theoretical importance that in conjunction with citizenship status produced 
a stable, feasible and more parsimonious model were the presumptive sentence, 
substantial assistance departure, and criminal history. Therefore, these were the 
random effects that were ultimately included in the following models. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 Examining more in-depth on these variations, it is interesting to consider both 
the fixed coefficients and the random effect variances. In particular reference to the 
Hispanic defendant being non-citizen, the interpretation of the random effects shows 
that for approximately two thirds of the states, non-citizens were sentenced to 
incarceration terms that were 2% lengthier and 13% shorter than citizens.33 This 
reveals two noteworthy facts about how Hispanic non-citizens are sentenced across 
                                                 
33 These values were obtained by adding and subtracting from the corresponding fixed effect 





states. First, the significance and magnitude of the random effects reveal that the 
effect of being non-citizen does vary across states. Second, the directionality of this 
effect also varies, with some states sentencing non-citizens to lengthier sentences, and 
others meting out shorter incarceration terms.  
Regarding the fixed effects, allowing for the slopes to vary across states in the 
mentioned variables led to very slight or imperceptible changes in all the estimates. In 
relation to citizenship status, being a non-citizen remained statistically significant and 
with the same directionality and magnitude in its coefficient effect. Concerning the 
contextual variables, it is noteworthy how the estimated percentage of unauthorized 
immigrants reached statistical significance once the random effects were included in 
the model. Interpreting the results for this estimate, a 1% increase in the number of 
unauthorized immigrants in a state was associated with approximately a .01% 
increase in sentence length. On the other hand, the estimate of Hispanic political 
representation retained statistical significance in this model and produced essentially 
the same results as in the previous one. None of the other contextual variables 
experienced any substantial modification. 
Results from Cross-Level Interaction Models 
 Results from these models are reported in Table 12.34 In the first place, it is 
noteworthy that among the cross-level interactions the only one that was marginally 
significant was the interaction between citizenship status and Hispanic political 
representation. A cautious interpretation is that the data do not support the existence 
of a non-citizen specific effect in interaction with most of the selected contextual 
                                                 
34 These interactive models were performed separately for each interaction effect and included all the 




variables, and that a very modest effect may have existed in the case of Hispanic 
political representation. In addition, only in the case of attitudes toward deportation 
and Hispanic political representation the interaction estimates had the expected 
negative directionality.  
 The finding for Hispanic political representation is probably the most 
noteworthy in the present study. It is interesting to note how it had a negative and 
significant effect for Hispanic citizens, but also negative–although only marginally 
significant–effect for Hispanic non-citizens. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the effect 
for the interactive effect by citizenship status is extremely low. Given these results, it 
is reasonable to say that it is likely that the effect of Hispanic political representation 
is negative and significant for the full sample, but that the evidence of a specific 
citizenship status effect is modest at best. 
It is apparent from these and the previous models that two of the proposed 
variables had an effect for both Hispanic citizens and non-citizens. Although the 
magnitude of the effects are slight, there is some evidence that an increase in the 
percent of unauthorized immigrants in a state is associated with small but significant 
increments in sentence length for Hispanic defendants. In addition, an increase in the 
percentage of Hispanic legislators in a state congress is associated with a minor but 
significant reduction in sentence length for both types of Hispanic defendants.  




Chapter 6:  Discussion 
Among the broader issues that surround the demand for immigration reform is 
the struggle of Hispanics for obtaining the U.S. citizenship. Probably seen as an 
avenue for fulfilling legitimate ambitions of a better future for them and their 
families, becoming a citizen is likely to be a life goal for a large number of Hispanic 
residents. In this context, the impact of the citizenship status on sentencing could 
have become a significant factor for explaining sentencing disparities among 
Hispanic defendants. One of the possible explanations to support this argument is that 
under the current conditions established by restrictive legislation and policy practices, 
deportation is almost an unavoidable consequence for non-citizens convicted of a 
federal crime. That is the core theoretical component of the so-called crimmigration 
law phenomenon. In essence, it is argued that the criminal and immigration laws are 
interchangeably and instrumentally used to formally legitimate and practically 
operationalize the prosecution and removal of non-citizens. This standpoint relies in 
the idea that immigration is perceived as threatening by the mainstream society.  
Under this reasoning, the role of the federal criminal justice system is 
consequential. As a republican institution, it works as a formal and legitimate 
mechanism of social control, although contemporary theoretical perspectives purport 
that substantial societal realities and bargaining practices play a decisive role in the 
decision-making processes of the criminal justice system (Savelsberg 1992; 
Sklansksy 2012). In this regard, the federal criminal justice system may be working 
as a mechanism for targeting, prosecuting and subsequently facilitating the 




the United States and their increasing presence in the federal criminal justice system 
during the last two decades, this phenomenon is likely to have a greater impact on 
individuals and communities of this ethnic group. The focus of this paper is precisely 
on how the implications of the so-called crimmigration law affect Hispanic 
defendants. For that purpose, this study proposed the innovative methodology of 
examining contextual variations in the punishment of Hispanic non-citizens across 
states, hypothesizing that those disparities may be related to the contextually 
differentiated impact of the more recent Hispanic immigration and its enforcement.     
This study started by examining whether or not Hispanic non-citizens receive 
shorter sentences than Hispanic citizens, with the idea that the criminal justice system 
may expedite their removal by imposing shorter incarceration terms. After controlling 
for legal and extralegal factors that previous research has shown to have some impact 
on sentencing outcomes, it emerged that Hispanic non-citizens do receive sentences 
that are on average approximately 6% shorter than those imposed on Hispanic 
citizens. This is consistent with what has been shown by the more recent research 
(Shermer & Johnson 2010; Spohn 2005; Wu & Spohn 2010), but goes beyond them 
because it reveals that the difference between citizens and non-citizens seems to be 
more consequential among Hispanics. In summary, this finding supports the notion 
that among Hispanics, non-citizens share one or more characteristics that influence 
judges to mete out shorter sentences.  
As already mentioned, this study purports that the more relevant factor for 
explaining that disparity is the practically unavoidable deportation that non-citizen 




do not provide the kind of information necessary to directly test this assumption. For 
that reason, the present work proposed to examine whether this link could be to some 
extent explained by the differentiated magnitude of the Hispanic immigration across 
states, their political positioning, and the enforcement of the immigration laws. 
The first logical step in the mentioned strategy was to determine whether or 
not there is a significant variation in punishment across states. After running an 
unconditional model, this assumption was supported by the data and concordant with 
what has been found in previous research. Although most of the variation in the 
dependent variable was explained by individual level legal factors, the theoretical and 
practical importance of the context should not be neglected. The random effects 
included in the analyses supported the assertion that there is variability across states 
in how Hispanic non-citizens are judged. Approximately two thirds of the states 
imposed on non-citizens sentences that were between 13% shorter and 2% lengthier 
than citizens. The next step was to explain that variation using contextual variables. 
The underlying theoretical argument of this work relies on the perception that 
Hispanic immigrants are threatening. The traditional conflict theories and the 
contemporary focal concerns perspective support this standpoint. Though, the 
expected behavior of the criminal justice system regarding Hispanic non-citizens was 
not harsher punishments but the opposite. This apparent counterintuitive proposition 
is on the contrary well-grounded on the theoretical presuppositions of this thesis. 
Since deportation may be considered not just a collateral consequence of punishment 
but a direct one for non-citizens, it is hypothesized that non-citizens receive shorter 




To test this assumption, this paper proposed five contextual variables to 
measure these realities. From the side of the increasing presence of Hispanics in the 
U.S. territory, this study used the Hispanic political representation, the Hispanic 
population, and the immigration caseload pressure per state. From the side of the 
enforcement, the analyses included whether or not a state signed a program intended 
to accelerate the removal of non-citizens, and the attitudes of their habitants in 
favoring or not the deportation of unauthorized immigrants. Preliminary analyses 
demonstrated that immigration caseload pressure was a variable that caused problems 
in the specification and stability of the models. For that reason, only the other four 
contextual variables were included in the ultimately reported models. 
The findings regarding these variables only partially supported some of the 
main notions and propositions of this paper. First, only Hispanic population and 
Hispanic political representation had a statistically significant impact on sentence 
length for the entire sample. Surprisingly, the directionality of the estimates of each 
of these two variables were contradictory. Indeed, a 1% people increase in the 
unauthorized immigrant population was associated with somewhat lengthier 
sentences, while 1% increase of Hispanic legislators in a state congress was 
associated with slightly shorter sentences. Even so, no evidence emerged that these 
effects were different for Hispanic citizens compared to Hispanic non-citizens in the 
case of the estimates of unauthorized immigrants, and not conclusive in the case of 
Hispanic political representation. In fact, the inclusion of interaction terms intended 
to find a specific citizenship status effect only produced a marginally significant 




Therefore, these contextual variables only partially contributed to explaining 
the disparity in punishment between citizens and non-citizens among Hispanic 
defendants across locations. However, they did contribute to explaining the 
contextual variation that existed across states in the punishment of Hispanic 
defendants. These are relevant findings that lends credence to the hypothesis that the 
immigration threat perspective as measured in this paper has significant effects on 




Chapter 7:  Conclusions and Limitations 
In spite of the innovations and relevant findings presented in this study, there 
is a number of limitations. First of all, the ideal approach to determine whether 
deportation plays a relevant role on sentencing would be to directly use deportability 
status restricted to non-citizens as a key independent variable. Nonetheless, the 
dataset does not provide the kind of information necessary to conduct such an 
analysis. Only in very few downward departure decisions do judges explicitly address 
deportation as a main or secondary reason for departing. This seems to confirm 
Chin’s (2011) assertion that judges are more likely to sentence non-citizens within but 
at the lower end of the guidelines grid. Consequently, whether or not deportation 
influences the decision of federal sentencing judges is something not entirely possible 
to disentangle. However, this limitation was taken as a challenge to be overcome by 
offering a novel approach to examining more thoroughly the contextual differences 
that exist across states in sentencing outcomes for Hispanic citizens and non-citizens. 
Another limitation that merits discussion relies on the choice and validity of 
the variables that were used to measure the contextually differentiated presence of 
Hispanic immigrants and its enforcement across states. No major problems are 
apparent regarding the Hispanic population and the percentage of Hispanic congress 
legislators in each state. However, concerning immigration enforcement and 
deportation, it would have been ideal to include data on deportation proceedings by 
district or state. This could have included data about rates of deported immigrants, 
efficiency in immigration proceedings, and waiver decisions. Unfortunately, the 




analysis. The problem refers to the fact that the immigration courts are located in a 
limited number of states and they have competence to judge non-citizens coming 
from different locations. Thus, it is not really viable to determine from which state a 
non-citizen comes. Using the available data from the 30 immigration jurisdictions 
could not only reduce statistical power, but also bias the estimates because they 
would not account for the true state emphasis on immigration enforcement.  
It is also necessary to point out that the measure of attitudes toward 
deportation suffers from some specific limitations that may affect the reliability of the 
variable estimate. First of all, it was based only on one question that assessed public 
opinion about whether unauthorized immigrants should be prosecuted and deported. 
The number of valid responses is low (n = 1,037) if the representativeness of the 
opinions are considered. There are states in which the number of respondents is less 
than five, with many of them having all the respondents favoring one of the answers. 
Therefore, this variable should not be seen as a true estimate of the intended 
parameter. Future research may include a more consistently measured estimate given 
that public’s attitudes toward deportation and immigration is a relevant and 
interesting factor to be considered by scholars on the sentencing research arena. 
Finally, one issue with the dataset is that the number of non-citizens is very 
small in many states. Though, this aspect did not represent a major obstacle for the 
present study as proposed. Nonetheless, prior research has shown that differences in 
terms of residency status (legal or illegal foreign resident) and country of origin have 
some significant effects on sentencing outcomes under certain circumstances. Thus, 




discussed and analyzed in this work. On the whole, taking into account that the main 
focus of this paper was on non-citizens in general, this was not a truly concern here. 
This paper attempted to demonstrate that there is contextual variation in the 
punishment of non-citizens among Hispanic defendants, and explain it using variables 
developed from an immigrant threat perspective. In that purpose, this study provides 
evidence in favor of the existence of that variation. Nonetheless, the proposed 
contextual variables did not significantly explained the contextual disparity in 
sentence length between Hispanic citizens and non-citizens. However, the percentage 
of Hispanic legislators in each state congress and the unauthorized immigrant 
population in each state had a significant effect on the punishment of Hispanic 
defendants regardless of their citizenship status. These are interesting findings that 
contribute to support the idea that broader immigration aspects have something do to 
with sentencing decisions for Hispanics. The context proves again to be a meaningful 
aspect to be considered by researchers. It is very likely that there are relevant 
differences in how Hispanic are sentenced across states, and this study sheds some 
light on explaining them.  
It is interesting to see how the political representation of Hispanics in state 
congresses is associated with the sentencing outcomes of this ethnic group. There 
could be several interpretations of the substance of this variable. On the one hand, the 
representation of Hispanics in state congresses may be a measure of the presence of 
Hispanics in that location. It is reasonable to assert that the number of congressmen is 
associated with the number of residents that supported and voted for them. In this 




Hispanic legislators in that congress. However, the population component by itself is 
not enough to explaining the magnitude of political representation. Those residents 
should be vested the right to vote and have enough political influence to promote 
politicians to elective positions. This may explain why 44% of legislators in the 
congress of New Mexico were Hispanic, whereas only 23% in California, the state 
more largely populated by Hispanics. Therefore, the number of Hispanic legislators in 
a state congress is the visible aspect of a possible series of factors, which in this 
particular case are also associated with reduced sentenced for Hispanics. 
By the same line of reasoning, an increase in the Hispanic population was 
instead associated with lengthier sentences. This finding gives credence to the threat 
argument in the sense that larger Hispanic populations feeds stereotypes that are to 
some extent reflected in the procedures and outcomes of the criminal justice system. 
Even though the magnitude of the effect is low, the fact that an increase in the 
population of a particular ethnic group is associated with an effect on sentencing is a 
remarkable aspect that indicates how meaningful is to consider aspects that may be 
tied to more particular concerns of the individuals of a particular ethnic group. From 
this discussion it emerges that the political representation of Hispanics may play an 
attenuating role regarding the threat perceived by their increasing presence. 
This paper traces several avenues for future research. First, the variation that 
exists in the punishment of Hispanics is a topic that warrants more examination. This 
paper proposed to explain it from an immigration threat standpoint and found 
interesting results. Future research may attempt to explain that variation from other 




punishment of Hispanics. Nonetheless, the inquiries raised by the propositions and 
findings of this thesis also call for more research based on immigration threat and 
enforcement viewpoints. These discussion and analysis could be improved by 
including more detailed data about how sentencing judges consider the deportability 
status of a defendant. In this regard, the United States Sentencing Commission may 
play a major role by requesting the explicit reporting of these considerations. The 
Supreme Court resolution in Padilla v. Kentucky may be taken as an opportunity to 
introducing more transparency in the judicial proceedings of Hispanic non-citizens. 
On the same path, reasonable credence has been given to the idea that the 
consideration of the deportability status of a Hispanic defendant is more heavily 
weighted and discussed at the earlier stages of the criminal proceedings. It is 
hypothesized that the prosecutor charge defendants for milder offenses and pleads for 
shorter incarceration terms in order to accelerate the removal of non-citizen offenders. 
Consequently, incorporating data from the earlier stages of the criminal proceedings 
could be a fruitful source of information for more neatly and accurately measure the 
specific weight of deportability statuses on sentencing. Prospective research may 
collect this type of data, which will probably contribute to better understanding the 
effect of immigration enforcement on sentencing. 
Another valuable way to investigate more in depth the contextual variations in 
the punishment of Hispanics is conducting longitudinal studies. The effect of 
immigration considerations on sentencing and its probable contextually differentiated 
emphasis is likely to have changed over time. The progressively increasing presence 




the federal judicial officers about their duties and expectations. The federal criminal 
justices system is each time more saturated with non-citizen offenders, most of whom 
are sentenced for immigration offenses. This noticeable change may be affecting not 
only the way in which non-citizens are judged, but also the way in which other types 
of offenses and offenders are sentenced. For instance, prior research has found that 
the magnitude of the caseload pressure, as well as its content has significant effects 
on sentencing (Johnson 2005). Prospective research may examine the sentencing 
disparities analyzed in this paper over time and also investigate the extent to which 
the increasing presence of non-citizens and the magnitude of the immigration 
offenses caseload has modified sentencing proceedings and outcomes.  
The main findings of this thesis may be interpreted in two ways. In the first 
place, it confirms what recent previous research has shown, in the sense that non-
citizens receive on average milder sentences than citizens. In this regard, the specific 
contribution of this study refers to the comparison between citizens and non-citizens 
among Hispanics. The conclusion is that the citizenship status does have an effect on 
sentencing among Hispanics. On the other hand, this study laid the ground for a 
discussion about how the political representation of Hispanics plays a role on 
sentencing. Future research should also consider the relatively important impact that 
increasing the political representation of Hispanics may have on the fate of Hispanic 
offenders. The idea that a more active and consequential political involvement may 
contribute to reducing disparities in the treatment of Hispanics by the formal social 
control institutions is striking and may call the attention of policymakers and 





Table 1. List of States with 287(g) and Fast-Track Programs 
States 287(g) Program Fast-track Program 
Alabama YES NO 
Alaska NO NO 
Arizona YES YES 
Arkansas YES NO 
California YES YES 
Colorado YES NO 
Connecticut YES NO 
Delaware NO NO 
Florida YES YES 
Georgia YES YES 
Hawaii NO NO 
Idaho NO YES 
Illinois NO NO 
Indiana NO NO 
Iowa NO NO 
Kansas NO YES 
Kentucky NO NO 
Louisiana NO NO 
Maine NO NO 
Maryland YES NO 
Massachusetts YES NO 
Michigan NO NO 
Minnesota NO NO 
Mississippi NO NO 
Missouri NO NO 
Montana NO NO 
Nebraska NO YES 
Nevada YES NO 
New Hampshire NO NO 
New Jersey YES NO 
New Mexico YES YES 
New York NO YES 
North Carolina YES NO 
North Dakota NO NO 
Ohio YES NO 
Oklahoma YES NO 
Oregon NO YES 
Pennsylvania NO NO 
Rhode Island NO NO 
South Carolina YES NO 
South Dakota NO NO 
Tennessee YES NO 
Texas YES YES 
Utah YES YES 
Vermont NO NO 
Virginia YES NO 
Washington NO YES 
West Virginia NO NO 
Wisconsin NO NO 




Table 2. Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables for USSC Federal Sentencing Data, FY2008 
Variables   Coding Scheme   Description 
Dependent Variable 
 Ln Sentence Length   Log (months)   Natural log of the total number of months of imprisonment (capped at 470). 
Individual-Level Independent Variables 
 Non-citizen  1 = yes  Dummy indicator for offenders who are not U.S. citizens. 
 




Natural log of the total adjusted minimum months of incarceration recommended by 
sentencing guidelines (capped at 470). 
 Criminal history   USSC Scale   United States Sentencing Commission’s scale rating prior criminal history from 1 to 6. 
 Downward Departure   1 = yes   Offender received 5K2 downward departure or any other downward departure. 
 Substantial Assistance Departure   1 = yes   Offender received 5K1.1 downward departure for substantial assistance to government. 
 Early disposition departures   1 = yes   Offender received 5K3.1 downward departure. 
 Upward departures   1 = yes   Offender received an upward departure. 
 Multiple counts   1 = yes   A dummy indicator for offenders convicted of multiple offenses. 
 Age at sentencing   Years   Age of offender at time of sentencing. 
 Male   1 = yes   A dummy indicator for male offenders. 
 Black  1 = Black  Dummy indicator for black, with non-black (white) the omitted category. 
 Financial dependent   1 = yes   A dummy indicator for offenders with financial dependents. 
 Post-high school education   1 = yes   A dummy indicator for offenders with any post-high-school education. 
 Presentence detainment   1 = yes   A dummy indicator for offenders detained or released prior to trial. 
 Trial conviction   1 = yes   A dummy indicator for offenders convicted at bench or jury trial. 
 
Type of offense 
  
2 dummy 
variables   
Dummy indicators for immigration and drug offenses, with other offenses as the 
reference category. 




1 = yes 
  
Dummy indicator for states that have adopted fast-track programs and/or 287(g) 
programs. 
 




A proportion index score (0 to 1) that measures the attitudes toward deportation of 
immigrants in each state. 
 




The number of immigration offenses cases divided by 100 and by the number of 
authorized judgeships per state. 
 Estimated unauthorized immigrants   Proportion   Percentage of unauthorized immigrants per state. 
  Hispanic political representation   Proportion   Percentage of Hispanic legislators in each state Congress. 




Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for USSC Federal Sentencing Data, FY 2008 
      Mean   SD   Min.   Max.   
Dependent Variable (N = 25,927) 
  Sentence Length   41.10   48.13   0.90  470.00  
 LnSentence Length   3.17  1.10  -0.11  6.15  
Individual-Level Variables (N = 25,927) 
 Defendant is non-citizen   0.77  0.42  0.00  1.00  
  Presumptive Sentence   47.32  55.40  0.90  447.00  
  LnPresumptive Sentence   3.18  1.36  -0.11  6.10  
  Criminal history   2.41  1.58  1.00  6.00  
 No Departure   0.59  0.49  0.00  1.00  
 Downward Departures   0.16  0.36  0.00  1.00  
 Substantial Assistance Departure   0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00  
  Early Disposition Departure   0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00  
  Upward Departures   0.02  0.12  0.00  1.00  
  Multiple counts   0.12  0.32  0.00  1.00  
  Defendant's age   33.37  9.47  17.00  83.00  
  Defendant is male   0.92  0.27  0.00  1.00  
 Non-black  0.98  0.14  0.00  1.00  
 Black  0.02  0.14  0.00  1.00  
 Financial dependent  0.72  0.45  0.00  1.00  
  Post-high school education   0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  
  Presentence detainment   0.91  0.29  0.00  1.00  
  Trial conviction   0.02  0.14  0.00  1.00  
 Immigration  0.36  0.48  0.00  1.00  
 Drug   0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00  
 Other crimes   0.77  0.42  0.00  1.00  
 Hazard rate  0.03  0.10  0.00  1.33  
State-Level Variables (N = 51) 
 Fast-track/287(g) programs   0.53  0.50  0.00  1.00  
 Favor deportation   0.65  0.21  0.00  1.00  
 Immigration caseload pressure   0.24  0.51  0.01  2.91  
 Estimated unauthorized immigrants   3.01  2.05  0.60  9.40  
  Hispanic political representation   3.55   7.51   0.00   44.00   





Table 4. Descriptive Statistics by Citizenship Status for USSC Federal Sentencing Data, FY 2008 
  
Citizens                        
(N = 6,063)   
Non-citizens                  
(N = 19,864)   
  Mean   SD   Mean   SD   
Dependent Variable  
  Sentence Length   60.91   62.04   35.06  41.13  
 LnSentence Length   3.59  1.15  3.04  1.04  
Individual-Level Variables 
  Presumptive Sentence   72.81  70.78  39.53  47.09  
  LnPresumptive Sentence   3.81  1.06  2.98  1.38  
  Criminal history   2.43  1.70  2.40  1.55  
 No Departure   0.58  0.49  0.59  0.49  
 Downward Departures   0.19  0.39  0.15  0.36  
 Substantial Assistance Departure   0.18  0.38  0.06  0.23  
  Early Disposition Departure   0.04  0.19  0.19  0.39  
  Upward Departures   0.01  0.12  0.02  0.13  
  Multiple counts   0.18  0.39  0.09  0.29  
  Defendant's age   32.86  10.22  33.53  9.23  
  Defendant is male   0.83  0.38  0.95  0.23  
 Non-black  0.97  0.18  0.98  0.13  
 Black  0.03  0.18  0.02  0.13  
 Financial dependent  0.68  0.46  0.73  0.44  
  Post-high school education   0.15  0.36  0.06  0.24  
  Presentence detainment   0.73  0.44  0.96  0.19  
  Trial conviction   0.03  0.18  0.01  0.12  
 Immigration  0.13  0.33  0.64  0.48  
 Drug   0.60  0.49  0.28  0.45  
 Other crimes   0.27  0.44  0.08  0.28  




Table 5. Correlation Matrix for Level 1 Individual-Level Predictors   
  (ID) A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q 
Non-citizen A 1.00                 
Presumptive Sentence B -0.25 1.00                
Criminal history C -0.01 0.11 1.00               
Upward Departures D 0.01 -0.04 0.01 1.00              
Downward Departure E -0.05 0.12 0.02 -0.05 1.00             
Substantial Assistance F -0.18 0.30 -0.10 -0.04 -0.13 1.00            
Early Disposition G 0.18 -0.11 0.15 -0.05 -0.19 -0.13 1.00           
Multiple counts H -0.12 0.29 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.13 1.00          
Age I 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.03 1.00         
Male J 0.18 0.04 0.16 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 1.00        
Black K -0.05 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.03 0.02 1.00       
Financial dependent L 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.00 0.01 1.00      
Education M -0.14 0.07 -0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.09 0.08 -0.07 0.03 -0.03 1.00     
Presentence detainment N 0.34 0.02 0.16 0.02 -0.05 -0.13 0.10 -0.05 -0.05 0.17 -0.01 0.02 -0.14 1.00    
Trial conviction O -0.07 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.19 0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 1.00   
Immigration P 0.43 -0.44 0.34 0.04 -0.05 -0.26 0.27 -0.26 0.02 0.11 -0.11 0.04 -0.18 0.19 -0.10 1.00  
Others Q -0.24 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.15 0.18 0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.12 -0.18 0.07 -0.39 1.00 
N=25,927.                   












Fast-track/287(g) programs 1.00 - - - - 
Attitudes toward deportation 0.16 1.00 - - - 
Immigration caseload pressure 0.28 0.08 1.00 - - 
Estimated unauthorized immigrants 0.57 -0.18 0.36 1.00 - 
Hispanic political representation 0.34 -0.02 0.86 0.53 1.00 






Table 7. Models of Case-Level Factors for Sentence Length 
  Individual-level factors   Ln Sentence Length   
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
   b  SE  b  SE  b  SE  
 Constant  4.25  0.59 *** 1.40  0.24 *** 1.26  0.24 *** 
 Defendant is non-citizen  -0.88  0.01 *** -0.06  0.01 *** -0.06  0.01 *** 
 Presumptive Sentence  -  -  0.74  0.00 *** 0.72  0.00 *** 
 Criminal history  -  -  0.01  0.00 *** 0.02  0.00 *** 
 Downward Departures  -  -  -0.41  0.01 *** -0.40  0.01 *** 
 Substantial Assistance Departure  -  -  -0.58  0.01 *** -0.58  0.01 *** 
 Early Disposition Departure  -  -  -0.58  0.01 *** -0.57  0.01 *** 
 Upward Departures  -  -  0.75  0.03 *** 0.75  0.03 *** 
 Multiple counts  -  -  -  -  0.05  0.01 *** 
 Defendant's age  -  -  -  -  0.00  0.00 *** 
 Defendant is male  -  -  -  -  0.06  0.01 *** 
 Black  -  -  -  -  0.12  0.02 *** 
 Financial dependent  -  -  -  -  0.00  0.01  
 Post-high school education  -  -  -  -  0.00  0.01  
 Presentence detainment  -  -  -  -  0.08  0.02 *** 
 Trial conviction  -  -  -  -  0.18  0.02 *** 
 Immigration crimes  -  -  -  -  -0.06  0.01 *** 
 Other crimes  -  -  -  -  -0.06  0.01 *** 
 Hazard rate  -5.61  0.12 *** -1.83  0.07 *** -1.60  0.08 *** 
 Block of district dummies  -  -  -  -  -  -  
 R2  0.29  0.86  0.86  
  N   25,927   25,927   25,927   
† p = .1; * p = .05; ** p = .01; *** p = .001. 




Table 8. Unconditional Two-Level HLM Model of Sentence Length 
Ln Sentence Length   
Fixed effects  b SE 
 Intercept  0.25*** 0.05 
Random effects Variance SD 
 Level 1  1.11*** 1.05 
 Level 2  0.11*** 0.34 
Between State proportion of variance 
      0.09   
† p = .1; * p = .05; ** p = .01; *** p = .001. 
Table 9. Two-Level HLM Random Intercept Model - Individual-
Level Fixed Effects 
  Individual-level factors   Ln Sentence Length     
   b  SE   
 Constant  0.22  0.02  *** 
 Defendant is non-citizen  -0.06  0.02  ** 
 Presumptive Sentence  0.72  0.02  *** 
 Criminal history  0.02  0.00  *** 
 Downward Departures  -0.40  0.02  *** 
 Substantial Assistance Departure  -0.57  0.09  *** 
 Early Disposition Departure  -0.57  0.05  *** 
 Upward Departures  0.76  0.07  *** 
 Multiple counts  0.05  0.02  * 
 Defendant's age  0.00  0.00  *** 
 Defendant is male  0.06  0.01  *** 
 Black  0.11  0.03  *** 
 Financial dependent  0.00  0.00   
 Post-high school education  0.00  0.01   
 Presentence detainment  0.08  0.07   
 Trial conviction  0.18  0.03  *** 
 Immigration crimes  -0.05  0.02  †  
 Other crimes  -0.04  0.02  †  
 Level 1 R2  0.85     
  Level 2 R2   0.92         





Table 10. Two-Level HLM Random Intercept Model - Individual-
Level and Contextual Fixed Effects 
  Individual-level factors   Ln Sentence Length     
   b  SE   
 Constant  0.12  0.02  *** 
 Defendant is non-citizen  -0.06  0.02  *** 
 Presumptive Sentence  0.72  0.02  *** 
 Criminal history  0.02  0.00  *** 
 Downward Departures  -0.40  0.02  *** 
 Substantial Assistance Departure  -0.57  0.09  *** 
 Early Disposition Departure  -0.56  0.05  *** 
 Upward Departures  0.76  0.07  *** 
 Multiple counts  0.05  0.02  * 
 Defendant's age  0.00  0.00  *** 
 Defendant is male  0.06  0.01  *** 
 Black  0.11  0.03  *** 
 Financial dependent  0.00  0.00   
 Post-high school education  0.00  0.01   
 Presentence detainment  0.08  0.07   
 Trial conviction  0.18  0.03  *** 
 Immigration crimes  -0.05  0.02  † 
 Other crimes  -0.04  0.02  † 
 Fast-track/287(g) programs  0.00  0.03   
 Favor deportation  -0.06  0.10   
 
Estimated unauthorized 
immigrants  0.00  0.01   
 Hispanic political representation  -0.01  0.00  *** 
 Level 1 R2  0.85     
  Level 2 R2   0.94         




Table 11. Two-Level HLM Random Coefficient Model - Individual and Contextual-
Level Fixed Effects 
  Part A             
  Individual-level factors   Ln Sentence Length     
   b  SE   
 Constant  0.12  0.02  *** 
 Defendant is non-citizen  -0.06  0.02  *** 
 Presumptive Sentence  0.75  0.01  *** 
 Criminal history  0.01  0.00  *** 
 Downward Departures  -0.42  0.03  *** 
 Substantial Assistance Departure  -0.57  0.04  *** 
 Early Disposition Departure  -0.58  0.04  *** 
 Upward Departures  0.73  0.05  *** 
 Multiple counts  0.05  0.02  ** 
 Defendant's age  0.00  0.00  *** 
 Defendant is male  0.06  0.02  *** 
 Black  0.09  0.03  *** 
 Financial dependent  0.00  0.00   
 Post-high school education  0.00  0.01   
 Presentence detainment  0.07  0.07   
 Trial conviction  0.16  0.03  *** 
 Immigration crimes  -0.04  0.02  † 
 Other crimes  -0.03  0.03   
 Fast-track/287(g) programs  -0.01  0.02   
 Favor deportation  0.03  0.05   
 
Estimated unauthorized 
immigrants  0.01  0.00  *** 
 Hispanic political representation  -0.01  0.00  *** 
† p = .1; * p = .05; ** p = .01; *** p = .001. 
Part B     
  Random effects   
Variance 
component   
SD of variance 
component     
 Defendant is non-citizen  0.0067  0.0819  *** 
 Presumptive Sentence  0.0078  0.0886  *** 
 Criminal history  0.0004  0.0193  *** 
  Substantial Assistance Departure   0.0515  0.2269   *** 





Table 12. HLM Cross-Level Citizenship Status Interaction Models 
      
Ln Sentence 
Length   
   b  SE  
Fast-track/287(g) programs Interaction      
  Intercept  0.123  0.018 *** 
 Defendant is non-citizen  -0.059  0.017 *** 
 Fast-track/287(g) programs  -0.007  0.017  
 Fast-track/287(g) programs*non-citizen  0.006  0.025  
Attitudes toward deportation Interaction      
  Intercept  0.123  0.018 *** 
 Defendant is non-citizen  -0.061  0.016 *** 
 Attitudes toward deportation  0.026  0.053  
 Attitudes toward deportation*non-citizen  -0.059  0.078  
Unauthorized immigrant Interaction      
 Intercept  0.123  0.018 *** 
 Defendant is non-citizen  -0.057  0.016 *** 
 Estimated unauthorized immigrants  0.014  0.003 *** 
 Unauthorized immigrants*non-citizen  0.002  0.004  
Hispanic political representation Interaction      
 Intercept  0.121  0.018 *** 
 Defendant is non-citizen  -0.080  0.020 *** 
 Hispanic political representation  -0.006  0.001 *** 
 Hispanic political rep.*non-citizen  -0.002  0.001 † 































Figure 2: Natural Log of Sentence Length in Months 
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